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Abstract
We study a location game where consumers are distributed according to some density
f and where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially. This permits an endogenous
determination of the number of active ¯rms, their locations and the sequence in which these
locations are occupied. While in general the analysis of such games is complicated by the
fact that equilibrium locations and the sequence of settlement must be determined simul-
taneously, we show that they can be independently derived for certain classes of densities
including monotone and, under some additional restrictions, hump-shaped and U-shaped
ones. For these classes we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. More-
over, when f is monotone and concave the equilibrium locations in areas where the density
is larger tend to be more pro¯table. When f is uniform the number of ¯rms entering in
equilibrium is minimal.
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11 Introduction
Explaining the determinants of product di®erentiation has a long tradition in economics. The-
oretical research typically focuses on ¯rms' location patterns in product space and on how these
depend on the market environment. Recent empirical research aims at assessing the impact of
the size of di®erent groups of consumers on ¯rms' choices of product characteristics. For ex-
ample, should a ¯rm cater larger (or economically more important) groups of consumers where
it also expects ¯erce competition, or is it better o® by targeting remote areas of the product
spectrum where competition tends to be less intense?
The canonical framework for analyzing these issues is due to Hotelling (1929). The theoret-
ical literature on Hotelling models can broadly be separated into three categories. First, there
are the location-cum-price models where two exogenously given ¯rms ¯rst choose locations
and then prices (e.g. Hotelling, 1929; d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979; Anderson,
Goeree, and Ramer, 1997). Second, there are the static models in which an exogenously given
number of players simultaneously choose locations only (e.g. Lerner and Singer, 1937; Downs,
1957; Eaton and Lipsey, 1975; Osborne, 1995). Common to both types of models is that they
are not easily amendable to the analysis of entry decisions.1 The desire to study market entry
has led Prescott and Visscher (1977, PV hereafter) to introduce a third variant of location
models, to which we refer as dynamic location games, where ¯rms enter sequentially, bear a
¯xed setup cost and cannot relocate once they have chosen their locations.
Almost exclusively, the theoretical literature studies models with uniformly distributed
consumers. The notable exception among location-cum-price models with an exogenously given
number of ¯rms is Anderson, Goeree, and Ramer (1997).2 As for sequential location-only
models, Palfrey (1984) and Callander (2005) are the only exceptions we are aware of where
1This is trivially true for the ¯rst approach. As for the second, it is well-known that di±culties such as
non-existence of pure strategy equilibria may arise (see e.g. Eaton and Lipsey, 1975).
2They note (p.101) that \one assumption, which is clearly unrealistic, has been left virtually untouched by
the tools of theorists. This is the condition that consumers are uniformly distributed...".
2two incumbent players are concerned with deterring entry by a third one, where the underlying
distributions are non-uniform, but symmetric.3
From a theoretical perspective, this focus on uniform distributions is not satisfactory as
some of the most interesting issues cannot be tackled. For example, whether ¯rms should
¯rst enter where there are many consumers and whether areas with more consumers are more
intensively catered by ¯rms necessarily requires a departure from the uniform distribution.
Empirically, the focus on the uniform case is even more problematic since there is by now
ample evidence for non-uniform consumer preferences.4
Relaxing the uniform assumption in dynamic location games is the point of departure of
this paper. Speci¯cally, we extend the framework of PV by considering larger classes of den-
sities. In a ¯rst step we develop the necessary concepts to analyze equilibrium behavior in
this generalized framework. Using these concepts, we then derive some general equilibrium
properties which do not qualitatively depend on the underlying distribution. A full equilibrium
characterization (i.e. how many ¯rms enter at which locations and in which order) of this seem-
ingly simple game is non-trivial because in general, equilibrium locations cannot be determined
without knowing the sequence of settlement, i.e. the sequence in which locations are occupied,
which in turn depends on the equilibrium locations themselves. However, a ¯rst contribution
of our paper is that we show that for certain classes of densities, equilibrium locations and the
equilibrium sequence of settlement can be independently determined. This makes the equilib-
rium characterization tractable. In particular, we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium
locations are independent of the sequence of settlement when the density is (i) monotonically
3In Loertscher and Muehlheusser (2008b), a ¯xed number of players enter in distinct markets, where the
distribution across markets may be non-uniform.
4Waldfogel (2003), George and Waldfogel (2003), George and Waldfogel (2006) and Waldfogel (2007) provide
evidence that preferences for media products di®er vastly across ethnic groups so that aggregate distributions
will be generically non-uniform. Similarly, consider the market for pharmaceutical drugs, where consumers'
\preferences" are given by the prevalence of various diseases. Since some diseases are rare and others very
prevalent in any given population, the distribution of consumer preferences will typically not be uniform.
3increasing or decreasing, (ii) hump-shaped and satis¯es an additional joint condition on the
entry cost and the density and (iii) U-shaped and satis¯es an additional symmetry condition
around its minimum.
Our model exhibits the following, intuitive comparative statics properties. First, larger
markets, or equivalently, markets with lower ¯xed costs, attract more entry and generate more
product variety. This is clearly consistent with the available empirical evidence.5 Second,
¯rms locate closer to each other in more densely populated segments of the product spectrum,
which re°ects the ¯ndings in Anderson, Goeree, and Ramer (1997, p.111) that \tight den-
sity functions are a force of agglomeration". Thus, consumers with similar preferences exert
positive externalities on each other. The existence and signi¯cance of such preference exter-
nalities is empirically well documented (see e.g. George and Waldfogel, 2003; Waldfogel, 2003,
2007). Third, despite the ¯ercer competition, equilibrium pro¯ts in these segments tend to
be larger than those in less densely populated areas. Therefore, somewhat loosely speaking,
¯rms should ¯rst enter where there are many consumers, despite the ¯ercer competition this
involves. Fourth, we discuss an extension of the model where ¯rms are allowed to operate
multiple outlets. We show that this extension is without consequences in that the equilibrium
locations in a model with only single-outlet ¯rms are also equilibrium locations in a model
with multi-product ¯rms. In other words, there is no product proliferation in the sense that
collusive and competitive outcomes coincide under the threat of entry. Therefore, the paper
also contributes to the classical debates on product proliferation (see e.g. Schmalensee, 1978;
Bonanno, 1987) and on the e®ect of horizontal mergers on product variety (see e.g. Berry and
Waldfogel, 2001; Federal Communications Commission, 2001; Sweeting, 2008).
Moreover, our analysis sheds new light on the uniform case by showing that it is rather spe-
cial in many important respects. First, it is the distribution that induces the smallest number
5See e.g. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and Waldfogel (2003) for media markets or Hsieh and Moretti (2003)
for real estate brokers.
4of active ¯rms in equilibrium.6 Second, as observed by PV the uniform distribution exhibits a
multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria, both with respect to locations and the sequence of
settlement. This indeterminacy is unique to the uniform case insofar as the equilibrium loca-
tions and the sequence of settlement are generically pinned down for the families of densities we
consider. Third, the multiplicity of equilibria under the uniform led PV to focus on a particu-
lar, symmetric equilibrium, where the sequence of settlement occurs from outside in. We show
that the resulting equilibrium locations are the ones that arise when the uniform distribution
is considered as the limit case of a symmetric hump-shaped density. While this result gives
some justi¯cation for PV's equilibrium selection, the equilibrium sequence of settlement tends
to be from inside out rather than outside in.7
Throughout, we abstract from consumer price competition after locations have been chosen.
The main reason for doing so is analytical tractability. The di±culties arising in models with
location-cum-price competition are well known even for the uniform case with two exogenously
given ¯rms (see e.g. d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979). Here they are exacerbated
not only by the fact that the distribution is non-uniform, but mainly by the inevitable problem
that one needs to know the pricing equilibrium with three or more active ¯rms. To the best
of our knowledge this problem has not yet been solved and therefore, we con¯ne attention to
pure location games in this paper.8
Of course, the extent to which our focusing on location choices is a good approximation to
real world markets is an empirical question. One natural application of our model are media
6This mirrors another result in the locations-cum-price model with two exogenously given ¯rms of Anderson,
Goeree, and Ramer (1997, p.105,125), namely that the uniform puts an upper bound on the degree of equilibrium
product di®erentiation.
7More generally, PV's claim (see their Footnote 5) that their outside-in principle would also be appropriate
for non-uniform distributions ¯nds no support for the classes of densities we consider.
8In addition, it is well-known that models with price competition are very sensitive to the functional form of
consumers' preference costs (see e.g. d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979). In contrast, our results do
not depend on whether these costs are, for example, linear or quadratic; all we need is that they are symmetric
and monotone in distance.
5markets, with ¯rms being newspapers, radio stations or TV broadcasters.9 Our reading of the
relevant empirical literature here is that location choice in product space is indeed of ¯rst order
importance while prices are not.10 Similarly, in on-air radio and TV broadcasting consumers
are not charged any direct prices.11
Apart from media markets, our model is also applicable to markets where prices are admin-
istered or where consumption decisions are made largely irrespective of prices. Pharmaceutical
products are natural examples of such markets since prices are typically regulated by the gov-
ernment. Moreover, in many countries consumers only pay a small fraction of the price of the
drugs they consume due to mandatory or private health insurance plans. Another industry
where price competition is essentially absent is real estate brokerage. Brokers do not set prices,
but rather commission fees that are levied on the transaction price. Empirically, these fees
exhibit almost no variance across markets and over time (see e.g. Hsieh and Moretti, 2003).
Thus, competition between brokers will mainly be in product location choices. Similarly, re-
tailers who face binding retail price maintenance contracts will by and large behave as price
taking ¯rms who compete in location choice.
Media ¯rms have most recently received a lot of attention in the two-sided markets liter-
ature. If one assumes that media ¯rms do not compete for consumers by setting prices, then
9Price competition is also naturally absent when considering product di®erentiation in the context of political
economy (see e.g. Downs, 1957; Palfrey, 1984; Osborne, 1995; Callander, 2005).
10For example, in their empirical analysis of the e®ect of the New York Times on local newspapers' content,
George and Waldfogel (2006) abstract completely from price competition. Indeed, when comparing, say, the
New York Times to the New York Post, the crucial distinguishing feature tends to be their (di®erent) locations
in product space, and not price di®erences. Moreover, there is remarkably little variation in prices over time
or across outlets and markets. According to George and Waldfogel (2000), 75% of general interest newspapers
in the U.S. were sold at 50 cent per copy in 2000. This is in stark contrast with the variance in newspaper
circulation.
11Another question in the media context concerns advertisements where ¯rms do compete in prices and which
is often by far the most important source of revenue for media ¯rms (see e.g. George and Waldfogel, 2000).
Borrowing ideas from Anderson and Coate (2005), we show in Appendix B that the model with media ¯rms
who compete ¯rst for consumers and then for advertisement revenue is easily amendable to price competition
for advertisements.
6our paper also relates to this literature; see e.g. Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2001), Rys-
man (2004), Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005), Anderson and Coate (2005), Rochet and Tirole
(2006) or Ambrus and Reisinger (2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In
Section 3 we develop the crucial concepts for the subsequent equilibrium analysis. Section 4
contains some general equilibrium properties. In Sections 5 and 6 we analyze monotone and
non-monotone densities, respectively. In Section 7 we ¯rst discuss the uniform case in some
detail, and then allow ¯rms to locate at multiple locations. Section 8 concludes. All proofs
are in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we provide an extension of the model where media ¯rms
compete in prices for advertisement revenue after choosing their locations.
2 The model
Consider a product market with a unit mass of consumers distributed along the [0;1]-interval
according to the cumulative distribution function F(x) with density f(x) > 0 for all x 2 [0;1].
There is a large number of ¯rms who can potentially enter the market. Firms move sequentially
in an exogenously given order.12 If ¯rm i is given the move, it decides whether or not to enter
the market. If it enters, it incurs a ¯xed cost K > 0 and chooses a location in [0;1]. In either
case, its decision is observed by all ¯rms moving subsequently. Once a location is chosen, it
is prohibitively costly to change it ex post.13 Each consumer patronizes the closest ¯rm. The
pro¯t of each active ¯rm, gross of the entry cost K, is equal to the mass of consumers it attracts.
To rule out trivial cases, we assume K < 1=2 such that the market can at least support two
¯rms. Apart from the possibility that later entrants may face a less attractive choice set, no
costs are associated with entering later. Finally, for convenience we assume that ¯rms stay out
when indi®erent.
12For the uniform case, Anderson and Engers (2001) analyze a model where the order of entry is endogenous.
13Such costs may include physical relocation costs, or advertisement costs to change the brand image of a ¯rm
(see e.g. PV).
73 Concepts
In this section, we develop several concepts which are crucial for the following equilibrium
analysis. We begin with the optimal location of a ¯rm in a given interval under the assumption
of no subsequent entry, and then turn to the issue of entry deterrence. Throughout the paper,
we refer to an interval (L;R) as one where the points L and R are already occupied by
competitors, and which is empty in the sense that no ¯rm is located in its interior.
3.1 Optimal locations absent further entry
Consider a ¯rm entering in an interval (L;R).14 Under the assumption of no further subsequent












That is, it attracts all customers between the midpoints between its own location and the
locations of its competitors to the right and left, respectively. Note that the "reach" of the
¯rm's customer base, or its market coverage, denoted by ¢(L;R), is simply half the interval





So choosing an optimal location within a given interval (L;R) is equivalent to ¯nding a location
x that maximizes the integral over ¢(L;R).
























14Note that while the interval (L;R) is open by de¯nition, ¯rms are not a priori prohibited to choose identical
locations. As shown below, however, such behavior is inconsistent with equilibrium.
8The lemma is obvious and requires no proof. It says that the pro¯t of a ¯rm, whose location
is ¯xed at some x 2 (L;R), is strictly increasing in the distance to its closest competitors.
Some additional notation is useful:
De¯nition 1 Denote by
(i) X¤(L;R) the set of optimal locations in the interval (L;R):
X¤(L;R) := arg max
x2(L;R)
¼(x;L;R):
An element of this set is denoted by x¤(L;R).15
(ii) ¼¤(L;R) the ¯rm's pro¯t when locating optimally:
¼¤(L;R) := ¼(x¤;L;R) for x¤ 2 X¤(L;R):
(iii) ^ X(z;z;L;R) the set of optimal locations in the interval (L;R) when the choice set is
restricted to some interval [z;z] ½ (L;R):
^ X(z;z;L;R) := arg max
x2[z;z]
¼(x;L;R)
An element of this set is denoted by ^ x(z;z;L;R).
(iv) ^ ¼(z;z;L;R) the ¯rm's pro¯t when choosing one of these optimal (restricted) locations:
^ ¼(z;z;L;R) = ¼ (^ x;L;R) for ^ x 2 ^ X(z;z;L;R):
(v) L+ := L + ² and R¡ := R ¡ ² for arbitrarily small ² > 0, the smallest and the largest
possible locations in (L;R), respectively.16
15For example for the uniform distribution, X
¤(L;R) = (L;R).
16Of course, since the interval (L;R) is open, L
+ and R
¡ are not well-de¯ned in a continuous framework. We
follow the standard notion in the literature where the continuous case emerges as the limit of a discrete choice
set with "grid size" ², where ² ! 0.
9Figure 1: y and ¸(y).























Intuitively, when x¤(L;R) is determined by a ¯rst-order condition, and the left-hand neigh-
bors comes closer, then it is optimal for the ¯rm at x¤(L;R) to also move in the direction of
that neighbor, but less so. As a result, by moving right the ¯rm at L would still gain costumers
to its right if its right-hand neighbor at x¤(L;R) is not already there.
Lemma 3 ¼¤(L;R) and ^ ¼(z;z;L;R) strictly decrease in L and strictly increase in R.
3.2 Entry-deterring locations
The following concepts are useful for addressing the issue of entry deterrence and for determin-
ing equilibrium con¯gurations. A distinction has to be made between entry deterrence (i) with
respect to an already occupied location inside (0,1), and (ii) with respect to one of the (in any
equilibrium unoccupied) boundary points f0;1g of the product spectrum.
De¯nition 2 (i) De¯ne ¸(y) and ½(y) such that
¼¤(y;¸(y)) = K and ¼¤(½(y);y) = K;
for any occupied locations y 2 [0;½(1)] and y 2 [¸(0);1], respectively.
(ii) Let
¸B := F¡1(K) and ½B := F¡1(1 ¡ K):
10Figure 2: ½(y) and y.
Note ¯rst that ¸(¢) and ½(¢) also depend on K. As for part (i), consider Figures 1 and 2 for
illustrations and note that ¸(y) > y and ½(y) < y. Observe also that ¸(¢) is the inverse of ½(¢),
i.e. ½(¸(y)) = y = ¸(½(y)).17 Intuitively, with competitors located at y and ¸(y), an entrant
would get exactly K when locating optimally in the interval (y;¸(y)) and, consequently, prefers
not to enter. The intuition for ½(y) is analogous.
Because ¼(x;L;R) strictly decreases in L and strictly increases in R for any x 2 (L;R),
¸(¢) and ½(¢) are unique. As will be shown below, for any occupied location y, ¸(y) is therefore
the largest entry-deterring location to the right of y. Analogously, ½(y) is the smallest entry-
deterring location to the left of y.
Part (ii) is an appropriate adaption of these de¯nitions to unoccupied boundary points: If
the left boundary point 0 is not occupied while a ¯rm is located at ¸B, an entrant would just
be deterred from entering in the interval [0;¸B).18 An analogous argument applies to the right
boundary point 1. Note that our assumption K < 1
2 implies ¸B < ½B.19
Lemma 4 (i) ¸(y) and ½(y) strictly increase in y.
(ii) For any two occupied locations L;R with L < R,
¸(L) > R , ½(R) < L , ¼¤(L;R) < K:
17Thus, ¸(y) · 1 holds for all y · ½(1) and ½(y) ¸ 0 holds for all y ¸ ¸(0).
18Note that an entrant's optimal location in this case would be ¸
¡
B for any distribution, since he gets the whole
hinterland. Moreover, we have ¸B < ¸(0), because the only di®erence refers to whether or not the end point
0 is occupied. By de¯nition of ¸B, this is not the case, and so a ¯rm locating at some x · ¸B gets the whole
hinterland to the left of x. However, when the end point 0 is occupied as is the case by de¯nition of ¸(0), this
hinterland is shared with the ¯rm at 0. Analogous reasoning establishes that ½(1) < ½B.
19It is now clear why the case K >
1
2 is trivial: either
1
2 < K < 1 (i.e. 0 < ½B < ¸B < 1), so that the ¯rst
¯rm would optimally enter somewhere in the interval [½B;¸B] thereby forestalling further entry. Or K ¸ 1 (i.e.
½B · 0 < 1 · ¸B), in which case the market could not even support one ¯rm.
11(iii) For any occupied locations y 2 [0;½(1)] and y 2 [¸(0);1], respectively,
K < F(¸(y)) ¡ F(y) · 2K and K < F(y) ¡ F(½(y)) · 2K:
(iv) For y given, ¸(y) is increasing, and ½(y) is decreasing in K.
Entry-deterring locations when F is uniform In the uniform case, any location in a
given interval (L;R) yields the same payo® of
F(R)¡F(L)
2 = R¡L
2 . Thus, by de¯nition of ¸(y),
¸(y)¡y
2 = K must hold, implying ¸(y)¡y = F(¸(y))¡F(y) = 2K. Analogously, y¡½(y) = 2K
holds. It then follows from part (iii) of Lemma 4 that the mass of consumers between two
entry deterring locations is maximum in the uniform case. As Theorem 9 below shows, this
also implies that the equilibrium number of active ¯rms will be minimum for the uniform
distribution.
4 General equilibrium properties
The remainder of the paper characterizes subgame perfect equilibria, to which we simply refer as
\equilibria". We ¯rst derive some general equilibrium properties, starting with an implication
of Lemma 4:
Corollary 1 Three occupied locations L;x;R, where L < x < R are not consistent with equi-
librium if
½(R) · L < x < R · ¸(L): (1)
When (1) holds, then ¼(x;L;R) · K for all x 2 (L;R) follows from Lemma 4. So the ¯rm at
location x could pro¯tably deviate by staying out of the market.
4.1 Number of entrants in a given interval
Denote by # the number of ¯rms entering in equilibrium in a given interval (L;R).
Theorem 1 In any equilibrium,
12(i) # = 0 if ½(R) · L < R · ¸(L)
(ii) # 2 f1;2g if L < ½(R) < ¸(L) < R
(iii) # ¸ 2 if L < ¸(L) < ½(R) < R.
Intuitively, in part (i) the market size in a given interval is too small to support pro¯table
entry. As the market size increases, so that we are in the case described by part (ii), at least
one entrant can pro¯tably enter in the interval. Whether this ¯rst entrant optimally forestalls
further entry or invites entry by one more ¯rm depends on the distribution of consumers. As
the market size increases even further, so that we are in the case described by part (iii), the
¯rst entrant can no longer deter further entry, so that in this case at least two ¯rms enter.
4.2 Distance between neighboring ¯rms
Apart from the number of ¯rms entering in equilibrium in a given interval, we can also say
something about distances between ¯rms in any equilibrium. We refer to two ¯rms at locations
L and R as neighbors when the interior of the interval (L;R) is empty. We start with the
following corollary of Theorem 1:
Corollary 2 In any equilibrium, two ¯rms at locations L and R are neighbors if and only if
¼¤(L;R) · K.
Part (i) of Theorem 1 implies that there will be no further entry if ¼¤(L;R) · K, which,
as will be recalled, is equivalent to ½(R) · L , R · ¸(L). To see that there is entry if
¼¤(L;R) > K, observe ¯rst that ¼¤(L;R) > K , ½(R) > L , R > ¸(L), for which case(s)
parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 1 say there will be entry. Hence, L and R cannot be neighbors
if ¼¤(L;R) > K. The import of Corollary 2 (and Theorem 1) is that there is entry in (L;R)
whenever ¼¤(L;R) > K, so that there are no \black holes". That is, it cannot happen in
equilibrium that a ¯rm does not enter in an interval (L;R) because it correctly fears that it
13would subsequently not break even because of further entry whereas it would pay to enter in
(L;R) were it the only entrant.
Theorem 2 For any three neighboring equilibrium locations L;x;R satisfying L < x < R, the
following condition must hold:
½(x) · L < ½(R) · x · ¸(L) < R · ¸(x): (2)
Theorem 2 is a statement about distances between neighboring ¯rms in any equilibrium:
First, the minimum distance between the ¯rms located at x and L must be strictly larger than
x ¡ ½(R). Otherwise, we would have L > ½(R) (i.e. when L is "too close"), then by Corollary
1, the ¯rm at x does not break even. The same argument applies to the right-hand side when
R < ¸(L).
Second, the maximum distance between the ¯rm located at x and its neighbors at L and
R, is x ¡ ½(x) and ¸(x) ¡ x, respectively. Otherwise, by Corollary 2, there would be entry in
between, contradicting that the ¯rms at locations x and L (respectively x and R) are neighbors.
Recall that we do not a priori rule out the possibility that ¯rms choose identical loca-
tions. However, the following implication of Theorem 2 establishes that this will not happen
in equilibrium:
Corollary 3 In any equilibrium, any location x 2 [0;1] is occupied by at most one ¯rm.
4.3 Range of product variety
Let a be the leftmost and b be the rightmost location that is occupied in equilibrium. Then:
Theorem 3
a · ¸B and b ¸ ½B:
A natural question is whether it is possible to prove the substantially stronger statement
that in any equilibrium, a = ¸B and b = ½B. Generally however, one cannot exclude the
14Figure 3: Optimal location and entry-deterrence for increasing f.
possibility that a ¯rm might want to locate to the left (right) of ¸B (½B) so as to induce its
closest neighbor to locate substantially further away (which it might if the neighbor's location
is given by a ¯rst order condition, see Lemma 2).
4.4 Equilibrium properties for quasiconcave densities
We end this section with a few properties that hold for the class of quasiconcave densities.
Lemma 5 Let f be quasiconcave over an interval (L;R) and consider any x¤(L;R) and any
locations y;z.
(i) If L < x¤(L;R) < y < z · R, then ¼(y;L;R) ¸ ¼(z;L;R) holds.
(ii) If L · y < z < x¤(L;R) < R, then ¼(y;L;R) · ¼(z;L;R) holds.
Consider now an interval (L;R) satisfying L < ½(R) < ¸(L) < R. From Theorem 1 we
know that at least one and at most two ¯rm(s) will enter in this interval. The next result
establishes that when f is quasiconcave, exactly one ¯rm will enter:
Lemma 6 Let f be quasiconcave over an interval (L;R) satisfying L < ½(R) < ¸(L) < R,
exactly one additional ¯rm will enter. This ¯rm locates at ^ x = ¸(L) if f is increasing, at
^ x = ½(R) if f is decreasing and at ^ x 2 [½(R);¸(L)] if f is hump-shaped, in which case the exact
location depends on the speci¯cs of f, K, L and R.
15The result is illustrated in Figure 3 for the case where f is increasing. Note ¯rst again the
di®erence between optimal locations in a given interval absent further entry, and optimal entry-
deterring ones: Clearly, x¤(L;R) = R¡ which, however, would invite further entry. As a result,
the ¯rst entrant optimally chooses the best entry-deterring location, ^ x(½(R);¸(L);L;R) = ¸(L),
thereby earning pro¯t ^ ¼(¢) < ¼¤(¢). Note also that the entrant's optimal location ¸(L) only




Let us now look at the cases where for all x 2 [0;1], f is strictly increasing and decreasing,
respectively. Let ¸0 ´ ¸B,
¸1 ´ ¸(¸B); ¸2 ´ ¸(¸1); ... ;¸k+1 ´ ¸(¸k);
½0 ´ ½B and
½1 ´ ½(½B); ½2 ´ ½(½1); ... ;½j+1 ´ ½(½j):
Let n ¸ 0 and m ¸ 0 be the largest integers such that
¸n < ½B and ¸B < ½m:
That such n and m exist and are unique follows from the monotonicity of ¸(¢) and ½(¢).20
Throughout we focus on the generic cases where ¸k 6= ½B and ¸B 6= ½k for any integer k.
Theorem 4 When f is monotone over [0;1], the set of equilibrium locations is unique.
20The restriction to strictly increasing (decreasing) functions can be easily relaxed since the analysis goes
through if f is °at on some parts of the interval [0,1] as long as it increases (decreases) su±ciently often. To be
precise, a su±cient condition is that in any interval [¸
k;¸
k+1] there is an x such that f increases (decreases) at
x. This will make sure that the best responses are unique.
16(i) When f is increasing, n + 2 ¯rms enter at locations
f¸B;¸1;::;¸n;½Bg:
(ii) When f is decreasing, m + 2 ¯rms enter at locations
f¸B;½m;::;½1;½Bg:
As for part (i), the optimal location of ¯rm i is driven solely by the location of its left-hand
neighbor, at location y say. As for the right-hand neighbor, either it is already there in which
case, because f is increasing, ¯rm i optimally moves to the right as far as possible without
inviting further entry to its left, which is at ¸(y). When i anticipates its right-hand neighbor to
be a subsequent entrant, then a fortiori ¸(y) is optimal for ¯rm i, because its future right-hand
neighbor will also optimally locate at ¸(¸(y)), so that i pushes this ¯rm as far to the right as
possible.
It follows that it is never optimal for a ¯rm not to locate at a ¸-location (except for
location ½B, of course), independent of whether its neighbors to the left and right (who will
also optimally locate at ¸-locations) are already there or will be future entrants. As a result,
for monotone densities the set of equilibrium locations is independent of when these locations
are occupied. Non-monotone densities will typically not have this property: In general, the set
of equilibrium locations will depend on the sequence in which these locations are taken and
vice versa, which renders the equilibrium analysis much more complicated.
Theorem 4 also implies that the distance between equilibrium locations becomes smaller as
the density increases. Hence, the more densely populated a segment of the product spectrum,
the more product variety will emerge in equilibrium in this segment.
Preference Externalities The present framework also exhibits what has become known
as \preference externalities" (see e.g. Waldfogel, 2003; George and Waldfogel, 2003) in a very
concise and natural way. To see this, assume in line with the empirical evidence presented in
17these studies that preferences di®er according to ethnic background, so that, say, a decreas-
ing (increasing) density describes the distribution of preferences in a population consisting of
Hispanics (Whites). Because ¯rm locations are closer together where the density is high, His-
panics have on average lower preference costs in the predominantly Hispanic area than in the
predominantly White area and vice versa.
5.2 Sequence of Settlement
In general, for a given distribution of consumers and order of entry, the sequence of settlement
is pinned down, where the earlier entrants grasp the larger pro¯ts, except when two or more
equilibrium pro¯ts are the same. Without additional information about f, however, it is
generally not possible to determine the full ordering of equilibrium pro¯ts. Nonetheless, some
results can be derived under fairly general conditions. In the following, we denote by ¼(y) the
equilibrium pro¯t of a ¯rm at equilibrium location y.
Recall from Theorem 4 that when f is increasing on [0;1], the two rightmost equilibrium
locations are ¸n and ½B, respectively. Analogously, when it is decreasing, the two leftmost
equilibrium locations are ¸B and ½m, respectively:
Theorem 5 (i) If f is increasing, then
¼(½B) > ¼(¸n);
such that location ½B will be occupied prior to location ¸n in any equilibrium.
(ii) If f is decreasing, then
¼(¸B) > ¼(½m);
such that location ¸B will be occupied prior to location ½m in any equilibrium.
Under the additional restriction that f is concave, we can also say something about the
ordering of the pro¯ts of the ¯rms locating in [0;¸n¡1] when f is increasing and of those locating
in [½m¡1;1] when f is decreasing.
18Theorem 6 (i) If f is increasing and weakly concave, then
¼(¸n¡1) > ::: > ¼(¸B)
holds, i.e the settlement of f¸B;:::;¸n¡1g occurs from the right to the left.
(ii) If f is decreasing and weakly concave, then
¼(½m¡1) > ::: > ¼(½B)
holds, i.e. the settlement of f½m¡1;:::;½Bg occurs from the left to the right.
Despite the fact that distances between neighboring ¯rms become smaller as the density
increases, ¯rms still tend to prefer these locations to those in less densely populated segments
of the product spectrum.21 Note that concavity of f is only a su±cient condition. The result
would also hold if f were somewhat convex, but not too much so. Equally or even more
importantly, the theorem holds for linear densities. In particular, it holds for any density with
slope f0(x) = ", where j " j6= 0 is arbitrarily small. Consequently, for any such density the
order of settlement will be generically unique (i.e. for almost every K). This contrasts sharply
with the uniform case, where the sequence of settlement is indeterminate since all, but at most
three, equilibrium locations are equally pro¯table (see also Section 7.1). Note also that an
outside-in principle as claimed by PV (p. 385) does not apply for strictly monotone densities:
as just shown, the sequence of settlement tends to be either from right to left (for f increasing)
or from left to right (for f decreasing). Moreover, as shown in Theorem 4, the determination
of the equilibrium locations themselves is driven by a sequence of ¸- or ½-functions. These are
de¯ned with respect to ¸B or ½B, depending on whether f is increasing or decreasing and so
this process either works from left to right or from right to left, but not outside-in in the sense
of PV.
21A potential exception is location ¸
n, since its right-hand neighbor is at ½B and thus not determined by a
¸-distance. For K large and n ¯xed, this distance, and the resulting pro¯t to the right of ¸
n become very small,
in which case it is a rather unattractive location.
19Figure 4: Hump shaped f
6 Non-monotone densities
6.1 Hump shaped densities
Consider now hump-shaped quasiconcave density functions such as depicted in Figure 4 which
exhibit a single hump at location H, and are thus increasing for all x < H, and decreasing for
all x > H. Moreover, let r ¸ 0 be such that f(¸r) is still increasing while f(¸r+1) is decreasing.
Analogously, let s ¸ 0 be such that f(½s) is decreasing and f(½s+1) is increasing.
Two cases emerge, depending on whether or not pro¯table entry is possible in the interval
(¸r;½s) (see Figures 5 and 6): In the ¯rst case, the locations ¸r and ½s are entry-deterring,
while in the second case they are not.22
It turns that the second case is substantially more complicated, because the equilibrium
locations and sequence of settlement can no longer be determined separately. Intuitively, for
a given number of entrants, the location \under the hump" tends to be the more pro¯table,
the lower K.23 Therefore, when K is su±ciently low, the ¯rst ¯rm will indeed optimally locate
under the hump. As a result, since the density is increasing in the direction of the hump, future
entrants (the neighbors of the ¯rst ¯rm, in particular) will optimally locate as close as possible
without inviting further entry to their other side (i.e. they choose some ¸- or ½-location as in









s in the second.
23Of course, whether or not a given location is attractive or not is endogenous to the game, which only goes
to further stress the complications that arise.
20Figure 5: Interval (¸r;½s) entry-deterring (case I)
the case where f is monotone, see Theorem 4).
On the other hand, when K is large, the location under the hump will only be occupied
at a later stage. In this case, earlier entrants might have an incentive to depart from these
¸- and ½-locations in order to push future entrants further away (including the one locating
under the hump). As shown in Lemma 2, this is possible when optimal locations are given by
a ¯rst-order condition. As a result, even when holding ¯xed the number of active ¯rms, both,
the equilibrium locations and the order of settlement may di®er for di®erent values of K.
In the present paper, we focus on the ¯rst case for which the equilibrium outcome can be
characterized by combining our previous result for monotone densities:24
Theorem 7 Let f be hump-shaped satisfying ½s+1 < ¸r. Then the unique set of equilibrium
locations is
f¸B;::;¸r;½s;::;½Bg;
so that r + s + 2 ¯rms enter.
If, in addition, f is symmetric in the sense that f(x) = f(1 ¡ x) for any x 2 [0;1], the
theorem yields the equilibrium locations whenever the number of entrants is even. The reason
is that, for f symmetric, an even number of entrants means \no entry under the hump", i.e.
r = s ´ n and ½n+1 < ¸n, so that the number of entrants is 2n + 2.
24We refer the interested reader to a companion paper (Loertscher and Muehlheusser, 2008a), which is exclu-
sively devoted to the second case.
21Figure 6: Interval (¸r;½s) not entry-deterring (case II)
Given Theorem 6, an albeit incomplete characterization of the sequence of settlement is
also at hand:
Corollary 4 Let f be hump-shaped quasiconcave satisfying ½s+1 < ¸r. Then, the sequence of
settlement of the locations f¸B;::;¸r¡1g occurs from the right to the left, and the sequence of
settlement of the locations f½s¡1;::;½Bg occurs from the left to the right.
The result follows directly from Theorem 6 and requires no separate proof. The characterization
is incomplete because without additional information on f it is not possible to (i) say anything
about the pro¯ts at locations ¸r and ½m and (ii) rank the locations to the left relative to those
on the right. Note that the sequence of settlement is again not \outside-in" in the sense of PV
but, essentially, \inside-out".
6.2 U-shaped densities
Consider now densities which are U-shaped around some trough location M, i.e. f is decreasing
for all x < M and increasing for all x > M (see Figure 7).
Lemma 7 When f is U-shaped over the interval (L;R), then x¤(L;R) 2 fL+;R¡g.
Lemma 7 has the following corollary:
Corollary 5 The minimum point M is never occupied in equilibrium.
22Figure 7: U-shaped f
Determining the full set of equilibrium locations when f is U-shaped is considerably simpli¯ed
by imposing the following symmetry condition. Denote by ½M and ¸M the analogs to ½B and
¸B with respect to the trough M when M is not occupied. That is, F(M) ¡ F(½M) = K and
F(¸M) ¡ F(M) = K.
De¯nition 3 The distribution F is trough-symmetric if
F(¸M) ¡ F(M) = F(M) ¡ F(2M ¡ ¸M):
Observe that trough-symmetry implies that ½M and ¸M are at the same distance from M,
i.e. ¸M ¡ M = M ¡ ½M. Notice also that any distribution that is symmetric around M is
trough-symmetric. Next, let
½1














Finally, let s and n be such that
½s+1
M < ¸B < ½s
M and ¸n
M < ½B < ¸n+1
M :
Clearly, n and s will only be positive integers when the ¯xed cost K is su±ciently small, which
we are assuming for the remainder of this section.






Intuitively, trough-symmetry ensures that the midpoint between ¯rms at ½M and ¸M is at
the trough M. By de¯nition of ½M and ¸M, each ¯rm gets pro¯t K in this interval. Moreover,
from Lemma 7, x¤(½M;¸M) = f½+
M;¸¡
Mg so that an entrant optimally locating in-between
would also just reap K and thus prefers not to enter.
As for the sequence of settlement, it follows directly from Theorem 5 that location ¸B (½B)
will be occupied prior to location ½s
M (¸n
M). Moreover, when in addition f is concave on each
of its two branches, Theorem 6 also applies:
Corollary 6 Let f be trough-symmetric and concave over the intervals [0;M] and [M;1], re-
spectively. Then, the sequence of settlement of the locations f¸n¡1
M ;::;¸Mg occurs from the right
to the left, and the sequence of settlement of the locations f½s¡1
M ;::;½Mg occurs from the left to
the right.
Again, the relative pro¯tability of the locations on each branch of f depends on the exact
speci¯cation. Since the sequence of settlement is, broadly speaking, from the outside in, it is
in accordance with PV's claim.
7 Discussion
7.1 Uniform distribution
PV analyze a special case of the present model where f is uniform. They focus on (subgame
perfect) equilibria where 2n+2 ¯rms enter at locations fK;::;(2n+1)K;1¡(2n+1)K;::;1¡Kg
for n ¸ 1. Using our notation, this can be equivalently written as25
f¸B;¸1;::;¸n;½n;::;½1;½Bg:
25Recall that for the uniform case, ¸B = K, ½B = 1 ¡ K, ¸(y) = y + 2K and ½(y) = y ¡ 2K.
24They argue that the equilibrium sequence of settlement for these locations is from outside
in, and if the number of active ¯rms is odd, a ¯nal entrant enters at 1=2. An interesting question
is therefore whether these equilibrium locations and the sequence of settlement emerge as the
limit case of the cases previously analyzed.26
Monotone densities De¯ne
fm
" (x) ´ 1 ¡ "=2 + "x
for all x 2 [0;1] and " 2 [¡2;2]. Note that fm
" (x) is an a±ne function that increases in x if " > 0
and decreases if " < 0 and that converges to the uniform density as " ! 0. Because fm
" (x) is an
a±ne function, it is also concave. Therefore, we know that for " > 0, the equilibrium locations
will be f¸B;¸1;::;¸n;½Bg and the sequence of settlement will tend to occur from right to left,
while for " < 0, the equilibrium locations are f¸B;½m;::;½1;½Bg and the sequence of settlement
is from left to right.27 So neither the equilibrium locations nor the equilibrium sequence of
settlement correspond to those of PV.
Hump-shaped densities As discussed after Theorem 7, we can solve for the equilibrium
locations with hump-shaped, symmetric densities when the number of entrants is even and thus
equal to 2n + 2.28 As will be shown, PV's equilibrium locations, though not their sequence
of settlement, can be obtained as the limiting case of the following hump-shaped density: Let
26In the non-generic cases where
1
K is an even number,
K
2 ¯rms enter indeed at locations fK;3K;:::;
1
2;:::;1¡
3K;1 ¡ Kg. But since all ¯rms then earn a pro¯t of 2K, the order of sequence is indeterminate, and so PV's
outside-in sequence is only one out of many possible sequences.
27It follows from Theorem 4 that n and m are (weakly) increasing respectively decreasing in ". Thus, for "
su±ciently large (in absolute terms), there will be more entry compared to the uniform case. However for "
su±ciently close to zero (which is the case of interest in our context) the number of active ¯rms is the same.
28The two conditions for the number of active ¯rms being equal to 2n+2 are (i) ¸
n < ½
n and (ii) ½
n+1 < ¸
n.







where the ¯rst inequality follows from (ii) and the second from (i).
25fh
" (x) ´ 1 ¡ "=4 + "x for x 2 [0;1=2] and fh
" (x) ´ 1 + 3"=4 ¡ "x for x 2 (1=2;1] and " 2 [0;4]
be the symmetric hump-shaped density with constant slopes.29
Before we can state the limit result as " ! 0, we must make sure this limit is well de¯ned
insofar as the number of entrants remains at 2n + 2. Theorem 9 below implies that no fewer
¯rms will enter under fh
" if 2n + 2 ¯rms enter under the uniform. However, we also need to
verify that 2n + 2 ¯rms enter for all " 2 [0;"0] if 2n + 2 ¯rms enter for some "0:
Lemma 8 If ½n+1 < ¸n holds for some "0 > 0, then it also holds for any " 2 [0;"0].
Lemma 8 implies a monotonicity property. As " increases from 0 to some positive number "0,
the equilibrium number of entrants increases monotonically (and weakly). So if the number of
active ¯rms under the uniform is 2n + 2, this will also be true for some "0. This allows us to
take the limit " ! 0, starting from "0. From Theorem 7, as " approaches zero, the equilibrium
locations will indeed be the ones derived by PV. This partially corroborates the equilibrium PV
focus on. It does so only partially because the equilibrium sequence of settlement is, broadly
speaking, from inside out, rather than from outside in.30
U-shaped densities Last, consider the density fh
" (x) for " 2 [¡4;0]. This is a two sided
triangle distribution that is symmetric around 1=2 and hence trough-symmetric. Therefore,
from Theorem 8, the equilibrium locations are determined from the minimum of fh
" (x), i.e. from
1=2. Since each branch of the density is again a concave function, it follows from Corollary 6
that the sequence of settlement is, broadly speaking, from the outside in, which is in accordance
with PV, but the equilibrium locations are not.
We conclude our discussion of the uniform case with the following result on the number of
active ¯rms in equilibrium for the uniform case:
29Note also that for " = 4, f
h
" (x) is the triangle distribution. If " < 0, f
h
" (x) is U-shaped (or V-shaped) and
has a trough at 1/2. For " = ¡4 it is the (trough symmetric) two-sided triangle.
30To be precise, the relative pro¯tability of the locations ¸
n and ½
n will depend on ", and so the sequence of
settlement may not be strictly from inside out. However, as shown in Corollary 4, all equilibrium locations to
the left (right) of ¸
n (½
n) are the more pro¯table the closer they are to ¸
n (½
n).
26Theorem 9 The number of active ¯rms in equilibrium is minimum when F is uniform.
For an intuition, consider the uniform density as the limit case of a monotonically increasing
density fm
" (x) which makes sure that all best replies are uniquely pinned down. Now consider
a ¯rm locating at some R to the right of a ¯rm located at L, where R is interior in the sense
that its righthand neighbor will not be ½B. Since R¡ is a best location in the interval (L;R),
and indeed for any " > 0 it will be the unique best location, it follows that when locating at
R = L + 2K a ¯rm can get exactly K to its left without attracting further entry in (L;R).
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, by doing so, which is in its very best interest, the ¯rm
locating at R generates pro¯ts of also exactly K to the right of L for the ¯rm at L. Iterating
the argument once more, it follows that the ¯rm at R will get K to its right as well and so gets
2K in total, which is the upper bound on the equilibrium pro¯t (part (iii) of Lemma 4). Thus,
in the equilibrium of the uniform case, all active ¯rms except the ones at ¸n and ½B reap the
maximum share of the overall industry pro¯t. Therefore, the smallest number of active ¯rms
is supported in equilibrium.
7.2 Multiple outlet ¯rms
Consider a variant of our model where ¯rms can operate multiple outlets so that, when given the
move, each ¯rm can choose to occupy as many locations as it wants to. Does this modi¯cation
have any e®ect on the set of equilibrium locations and therefore on the available product variety
consumers can enjoy?
Assume for simplicity that the density is monotone and that the cost per outlet is K for each
¯rm. Then, the ¯rst ¯rm will optimally occupy the same set of locations as derived in Theorem
4 for the single-outlet case, thereby monopolizing the market. Intuitively, these locations are
essentially determined by ¯rms' concern of deterring further entry; whether a ¯rm is a single-
or a multi-product ¯rm does not a®ect this concern. Since this set of locations forestalls further
entry with the minimal number of outlets, it is the optimal choice for the ¯rst entrant.
27Using this insight, our analysis contributes to a classic antitrust debate, where Bonanno
(1987) argued against Schmalensee (1978) that entry deterrence will not necessarily lead to
product proliferation, but may rather involve product locations that di®er from those absent
the concern of deterring entry. In our framework, whether locations are chosen competitively
or collusively does not a®ect the set of locations, provided there is a threat of entry. However,
since absent the threat of entry a monopoly would open only one outlet because of the ¯xed
setup cost and the full market coverage assumption (i.e. all consumers would consume the
good if it is the only one supplied), the model entails product proliferation in the sense of
Schmalensee (1978).
The extended model with multi-product ¯rms can also capture the e®ects of horizontal
mergers. Our model's predictions are consistent with the hypothesis that the equilibrium lo-
cations of two outlets do not depend on whether or not they are owned by the same ¯rm.31
In this respect, our model is in line with empirical ¯ndings in the context of mergers of radio
stations presented by Federal Communications Commission (2001), but contrasts with Berry
and Waldfogel (2001). However, as noted in Federal Communications Commission (2001, Foot-
note 15), empirical results seem to crucially depend on how music formats are de¯ned (see also
Sweeting, 2008).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study dynamic location games, in which ¯rms enter sequentially and pay a
¯xed cost upon entry. Our analysis focuses on the impact of the underlying distribution of
consumer preferences on the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, i.e. the number of active
31This statement needs to be slightly quali¯ed as equilibrium locations need no longer be unique with multi-
product ¯rms. For example, whenever three neighboring locations are occupied with outlets owned by the same
¯rm, this ¯rm is indi®erent with respect to the location of the outlet in the middle (provided it still deters
entry) since the ¯rm's total pro¯t does not depend on the location of the middle outlet. Similarly, if, say,
the two rightmost locations are occupied by outlets of the same ¯rm, the location of the rightmost outlet is
indeterminate as long as it forestalls further entry.
28¯rms, their locations and the sequence of settlement.
We show that for certain classes of densities, the equilibrium locations and the equilibrium
sequence of settlement are independent. In particular, this is true for monotone densities for
which case the equilibrium outcome is characterized. Under some further conditions, indepen-
dence is shown to hold also for non-monotone densities (hump- and U-shaped), in which case
the equilibrium number of ¯rms and their locations are readily determined by combining our
results for monotone densities.
Our framework exhibits the intuitive features that larger markets attract more entry and
that areas with higher density attract more ¯rms. Thereby, it gives rise to what has become
known as preference externalities in a natural and concise way. If densities are monotone
and concave, the equilibrium sequence of settlement tends to begin with the locations with
high density despite the ¯ercer competition these locations entail. By and large, equilibrium
locations with little density are occupied last.
We also show that the optimal (entry-deterring) locations that are chosen by single-outlet
¯rms are also optimal locations chosen by a monopolistic ¯rm that operates multiple outlets and
faces the threat of entry. Last, but not least, the uniform distribution, on which the previous
theoretical literature has almost exclusively focused, has the special feature of inducing the
minimum numbers of ¯rms to enter in equilibrium.
One avenue for further research seems particularly promising: We have assumed throughout
that though entry occurs sequentially, the only cost of late entry is that pro¯table locations are
occupied ¯rst. An interesting modi¯cation would be to consider a multi-period model, where
in every period one ¯rm may enter, but payo®s accrue to every active ¯rm in every period.
This would add a trade-o® between short-term and long-term pro¯ts, which seems empirically
relevant. From a short-term perspective, the most attractive locations are those where the
closest neighbors are far away or where the density of consumers is large. However, these are
also the locations that are prone to attract additional entrants in the future.
29Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
In the proof, we con¯ne attention to ¼¤ as the arguments regarding ^ ¼ are completely analogous.
The proof for the reaction of ¼¤(L;R) to changes in L and R relies on a revealed preference
argument: Fix some x¤(L;R) 2 X¤(L;R) and suppose that the competitor to the left moves
to some L0 > L. We have to consider two cases.
Case 1: x¤(L;R) 2 X¤(L0;R). From Lemma 1, it follows directly that ¼(x¤(L;R);L0;R) <
¼¤(L;R).
Case 2: x¤(L;R) = 2 X¤(L0;R). To see that ¼¤(L0;R) < ¼¤(L;R) holds, suppose otherwise
that ¼¤(L0;R) ¸ ¼¤(L;R). By de¯nition of x¤(L;R), however, ¼¤(L;R) ¸ ¼(x¤(L0;R);L;R).
30Therefore, if the ¯rst inequality holds, then so does
¼¤(L0;R) ¸ ¼(x¤(L0;R);L;R):
But this is a contradiction to Lemma 1. Completely analogous arguments apply to changes of
R. ¥
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Part (i) Suppose, for notational simplicity, that optimal locations are unique. By de¯nition,
when locating at x¤(y;¸(y)), an entrant gets K. When the ¯rm to the left is instead located
at some y0 > y, ¼¤(y0;¸(y)) < K follows from Lemma 3. This Lemma also implies that
¼¤(y0;¸(y0)) = K can hold only if ¸(y0) > ¸(y). A completely analogous argument establishes
that ½(¢) is also increasing in y.
Part (ii) By construction ¸(½(R)) = R and by part (i) ¸(y) increases in y. Hence, ½(R) < L
implies ¸(L) > R. That this implies ¼¤(L;R) < K follows from De¯nition 2.
Part (iii) F(¸(y))¡F(y) > K and F(y)¡F(½(y)) > K follows trivially from the de¯nition





) ¡ F(y) · K and F(¸(y)) ¡ F(
¸(y) + y
2
) · K: (3)
To see this, suppose to the contrary that F(
¸(y)+y
2 ) ¡ F(y) > K. Then an entrant could
locate at y+ and get ¼(y+;y;¸(y)) = F(
¸(y)+y
2 ) ¡ F(y) > K which contradicts the de¯nition





2 ) = F(¸(y))¡F(y) · 2K. The proof for the statement
with respect to ½(y) is completely analogous.
Part (iv) By de¯nition, when locating at x¤(y;¸(y)), an entrant gets K. When K increases
to K0 > K, the set of optimal locations does not change, and thus ¼¤(y;¸(y)) < T0 holds. Thus,
31by Lemma 3, for a given y, ¼¤(y;¸(y)) = K0 can hold only if ¸(y) increases. A completely
analogous argument establishes that ½(y) decreases in K. ¥
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Recall ¯rst that because of the symmetry of ¸(¢) and ½(¢), the cases ½(R) < L < ¸(L) < R and
L < ½(R) < R < ¸(L) cannot occur. So only the three cases stated in the theorem need to be
considered.
Part (i) By de¯nition of ¸(L) and ½(R), and from Corollary 1, pro¯table entry in the
interval (L;R) is not possible in this case, and thus no ¯rm will enter in equilibrium.
Part (ii) Label subsequent entrants by i;i+1;i+2;:::. We show that a) at most two ¯rms
enter in equilibrium, and b) at least one enters.
a) At most two ¯rms enter
If the ¯rst entrant i enters at some xi 2 [½(R);¸(L)], then by de¯nition of ¸(¢) and ½(¢), there
will be no further entry in the interval [L;R]. So consider the case where xi = 2 [½(R);¸(L)], and
suppose xi 2 (L;½(R)). The case xi 2 (¸(L);R) is completely analogous and thus omitted. By
Corollary 1, if subsequently i+1 enters, it must enter at some xi+1 > ¸(L): For xi+1 2 (L;xi],
¯rm i + 1 itself would incur a loss, for xi+1 2 (xi;¸(L)], ¯rm i would do so. For two ¯rms
to enter, it therefore has to be the case that one, say i, locates at xi < ½(R) and the other
one at xi+1 > ¸(L). But now a third ¯rm cannot pro¯tably enter because at least one of
the ¯rms would not break even. This follows again from Corollary 1: For xi+2 2 (L;xi) or
xi+2 2 (xi+1;R), ¯rm i + 2 does not break even, for xi+2 2 (L;¸(L)), i does not break even,
and for xi+2 2 (¸(L);xi+2), ¯rm i + 1 does not break even.
b) At least one ¯rm enters
Three cases have to be considered:
Case 1: There is a x¤(L;R) 2 [½(R);¸(L)]. In this case, the ¯rst entrant chooses this
location, thereby preventing further entry. Moreover ¼¤(L;R) > K since L < ½(R) < ¸(L) < R.
32Case 2: There is no x¤(L;R) 2 [½(R);¸(L)] but ^ ¼(½(R);¸(L);L;R) > K. In this case, at
least one ¯rm will enter since ^ x(½(R);¸(L);L;R) is a pro¯table and entry-deterring location.
Whether one or two ¯rms enter depends on whether the ¯rst ¯rm i prefers an alternative
location, thereby inducing subsequent entry, to ^ x(½(R);¸(L);L;R) and thereby deterring entry.
Case 3: ^ ¼(½(R);¸(L);L;R) · K. Observe ¯rst that this implies x¤(L;¸(L)) < ½(R) and
x¤(½(R);R) > ¸(L). We need to show that at least one ¯rm enters, assuming equilibrium
behavior by ¯rms moving subsequently. That is, we have to show that there exists some
xi 2 (L;R) such that i's pro¯t at xi exceeds K if all subsequent ¯rms play optimally. Let i
occupy the location x¤(L;¸(L)). Observe ¯rst that there will be no subsequent entry to the
left of ¯rm i, because by Corollary 1, for any location y 2 (L;xi), ¼(y;L;xi) < K holds. A
necessary condition for i not to break even at x¤(L;¸(L)) is therefore that (at least) one other
¯rm, say, i+1 enters to its right at some xi+1 · ¸(L). Only in this situation will i be "trapped"
inside the [L;¸(L)] interval (Corollary 1). So assume xi+1 · ¸(L). But for i + 1 to enter at
xi+1 in equilibrium, it must be the case that i + 1 earns more than K either by deterring
further entry or by "pushing" any subsequent entrant far enough to the right. But if i+1 earns
more than K at xi+1 with xi > L to its left, then i could have chosen the location xi+1 itself,
whereby it would have earned strictly more than i + 1 now does. Therefore, i can guarantee
itself a pro¯t that is larger than K. Consequently, at least on ¯rm will enter in equilibrium.
Part (iii) The proof relies on the validity of the following claim:
Claim: At least one ¯rm can pro¯tably enter either in the interval (L;¸(L)) or in the
interval (½(R);R).
We prove the claim for the case where the ¯rst entrant i enters in the interval (L;¸(L)), for
the other one it is completely analogous. Suppose the ¯rst entrant i locates at xi = x¤(L;¸(L)).
Since x¤(L;¸(L)) < ¸(L), there will be no more entry to the left of xi (by Corollary 1). Let
the closest ¯rm to the right of ¯rm i be ¯rm i + 1 at some location x0
i+1: If x0
i+1 > ¸(L), then
¼(x¤(L;¸(L));L;x0
i+1) > K.
33Thus, as above, the critical case is x0
i+1 · ¸(L) such that ¯rm i would not break even (again
by Corollary 1). Note that ¯rm i+1 would choose such a position only if ¼(x0
i+1;xi;xi+2) > K
where xi+2 > ¸(xi) is the closest ¯rm to the right of ¯rm i + 1. But then, ¯rm i could itself
locate at xi = x0
i+1 and earn ¼(x0
i+1;L;xi+2) > ¼(x0
i+1;xi;xi+2) > K since there will be no
further entry in the interval (L;xi+1). Consequently, there always exists a location in the
interval (L;¸(L)) such that entry is pro¯table for at least one ¯rm.
How many more ¯rms enter depends on the location of ¸(xi). If ¸(xi) > ½(R), we are in
part (ii), where it was shown that at least one more ¯rm enters. If ¸(xi) < ½(R), then we are
again in part (iii) in which case at least two more ¯rms enter. ¥
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
From Corollary 1, if ½(R) · L, or if R · ¸(L), the ¯rm at x could pro¯tably deviate by staying
out. Moreover from Corollary 2, when the distance between the ¯rm at x and its neighbors
exceeds x ¡ ½(x) and ¸(x) ¡ x, respectively, then there will be entry in between, contradicting
that x and L (respectively x and R) are neighbors. ¥
A.6 Proof of Corollary 3
As shown in Theorem 2, in any equilibrium the maximum distance between a ¯rm at location x
and its neighbors to the left and right is x¡½(x) and ¸(x)¡x, respectively. Moreover, as shown
in the proof of part (iii) of Lemma 4, F(
¸(x)+x
2 ) ¡ F(x) · K and F(x) ¡ F(
½(x)+x
2 ) · K, so




2 ) · 2K holds. Therefore,
independent of how this pro¯t is shared between the ¯rms located at x, at most one can break
even. ¥
A.7 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is straightforward and by contradiction: Assume not, i.e. assume, say, a > ¸B.
Then a ¯rm could pro¯tably enter at ¸B and get K to its left (without attracting further entry
34there) and earn strictly positive pro¯t to its right. ¥
A.8 Proof of Lemma 5
Consider without loss of generality part (i). If f is monotonously decreasing over the interval
(L;R), then x¤(L;R) is unique and equal to L+: Recall that when locating in (L;R), the
reach of a ¯rm's customer base is ¢(L;R) = R¡L
2 , and thus independent of the ¯rm's location.
However, the ¯rm's pro¯t strictly increases as it moves closer to x¤ since the density is strictly
higher to the left.
If f is hump-shaped, then x¤ is interior, satisfying f(x¤+L
2 ) = f(x¤+R
2 ). Consequently, for
any x > x¤, f(x+L
2 ) ¸ f(x+R
2 ) holds. Thus, when moving left from x the marginal gain on the
left will be (weakly) larger than the marginal loss on the right. Hence, ¼(y;L;R) ¸ ¼(z;L;R)
for any z > y > x¤ follows. Note that the inequality statements in the Lemma become strict
when f is either monotone, or when f0 = 0 for at most one location. ¥
A.9 Proof of Lemma 6
That at least one additional ¯rm enters follows from Theorem 1. So we are left to show that
further entry deterrence is optimal for the ¯rst entrant. There are two cases: Either f is
monotone or it is hump shaped as in Figure 4. We ¯rst consider the monotone case, focusing
without loss of generality on increasing functions.
Let i be this entrant and suppose to the contrary that i accommodates further entry either
by choosing xi 2 (¸(L);R) or xi 2 (L;½(R)). If xi 2 (L;½(R)) is an equilibrium outcome,
then the next entrant will deter entry (by Theorem 1). He optimally does so by choosing
^ x(½(xi);¸(L);L;xi) = ¸(L). But in this case, xi is in between two neighbors who are in the
interval [½(R);R]. By Corollary 1, i cannot break even. Hence, this cannot be optimal for i.
If, on the other hand, i chooses xi 2 (L;½(R)), the subsequently entering ¯rm will, again,
deter entry. It optimally does so by choosing ^ x(½(R);¸(xi);xi;R) = ¸(xi). In this case, i earns
35strictly less than he would had he located at ¸(L) and thereby deterred entry: Both the length
of the interval he captures is now
¸(xi)¡L
2 instead of R¡L
2 which he would cover when deterring
entry, and the density over this interval is smaller than the density he would get when deterring
entry. Hence, i will optimally deter entry. He optimally does so by locating at ¸(L). Note that
i's pro¯t will also be strictly higher than K, since x¤(L;¸(L)) = ¸(L)¡ so that ¼¤(L;¸(L)) = K
and R > ¸(L) (by Lemma 3).
Consider now the case where f is hump-shaped. If there exist x¤(L;R) 2 [½(R);¸(L)]
the claim is established since these optimal locations in (L;R) are themselves entry-deterring.
So assume there is no x¤(L;R) 2 [½(R);¸(L)], and without loss of generality consider some
x¤(L;R) < ½(R) (the case x¤(L;R) > ¸(L) is completely analogous). By Lemma 5, ^ x(½(R);¸(L);L;R) =
½(R) and ^ ¼(½(R);¸(L);L;R) > ¼(x;L;R) for any x > ¸(L). Hence, the optimal entry deter-
ring location yields a larger pro¯t than locating to the right of ¸(L). Hence, i will never choose
xi 2 [¸(L);L). So assume xi 2 (L;½(R)). Then, either (a) the subsequent (and, by Theorem
1, last) entrant's unconstrained optimal location in (xi;R), x¤(xi;R), will be given by the ¯rst
order condition. In this case, though, by Lemma 2, x¤(xi;R) < x¤(L;R) and by Lemma 5, the
last entrant's optimal entry deterring location will be ½(R). Or, (b) x¤(xi;R) will be a corner
solution, in which case it will be x+
i . Hence, again, the last entrant's optimal entry deterring
location is ½(R). Both in case (a) and (b) xi will be "trapped" inside [L;¸(L)], where it cannot
break even due to Corollary 1.
Observe also that by deterring entry, i nets a pro¯t that is strictly larger than K. This is
obvious for x¤(L;R) 2 [½(R);¸(L)]. If such locations do not exist, then, by Lemma 5, for any
x¤(L;R) 2 (L;½(R)), we have ^ x(½(R);¸(L);L;R) = ½(R). Hence, ¼(½(R)+;½(R);R) = K, but
¼(½(R);L;R) > ¼(½(R)+;½(R);R) = K. Similarly, for any x¤(L;R) > ¸(L), ^ x(½(R);¸(L);L;R) =
¸(L) and consequently ¼(¸(L);L;R) > K. ¥
36A.10 Proof of Theorem 4
We only prove part (i), the proof for part (ii) is completely analogous.
Existence. We ¯rst show that f¸B;¸1;::;¸n;½Bg are equilibrium locations. To that end,
assume for the moment that locations ¸B and ½B are occupied and that all remaining ¯rms
play the following strategy: "Enter to the right of some location xi only if its closest righthand
neighbor, i + 1, is at some xi+1 > ¸(xi) and when ¸(xi) < ½B. If you enter to the right of xi,
enter at ¸(xi)." Call this the ¸-strategy.
To see that these strategies are mutual best responses, notice ¯rst that not to enter in
[xi;xi+1] if xi+1 · ¸(xi) is, obviously, a best response. Second, if xi+1 is the future righthand
neighbor of the entering ¯rm and if xi+1 > ¸(xi), then entry at ¸(xi) is optimal within the
interval [xi;xi+1], as we know from Lemma 6. (And since all better options are taken before
by other ¯rms in case there are better options, at some point some ¯rm will enter here.) If the
righthand neighbor xi+1 has not taken its location yet but plays the ¸-strategy, then a fortiori
¸(xi) is optimal for the entrant: Not only is it the largest location that deters entry to its left,
but it will also push its righthand neighbor i + 1 as far to the right as possible.
Moreover, under the ¸-strategy, the locations ¸B and ½B will also be occupied: As for the
leftmost location, since the density is increasing, it is optimal to move right as far as possible
without inviting further entry to the left which, by de¯nition, is at ¸B. Moreover, under the
¸-strategy, the rightmost location will not a®ect any of the location choices of the other ¯rms.
It follows that it is optimal to locate as far left as possible without inviting further entry to
the right which, again by de¯nition, is at ½B.
Uniqueness. If the future left-hand and righthand neighbor to some entrant are given at,
again, xi and xi+1, respectively, then ¸(xi) is still the best response of the entrant in [xi;xi+1].
Observe also that it is the unique best response. So one way ¸(xi) could not be the best
response of the entrant with neighbors at xi and xi+1 is that i + 1 has not taken his location
37and threatens to locate the closer to the entrant the closer the entrant's location to ¸(xi).
Assume that the entrant believes this threat and that his best response would be to locate at
some y < ¸(xi).
To see that this threat is empty in equilibrium (i.e. even if i played his best response to
this threat, the threat would in turn not be a best reply), consider the last entrant, say l, to
the right of our entrant. Clearly, l's best response will be to locate at ¸(xl¡1), where xl¡1
is the last entrant's left-hand neighbor (which may or may not be i + 1). Anticipating this,
l ¡ 1 recognizes that l's best responses increases in his own location, and thus he chooses the
largest location which allows him to deter entry to his left. By iteration, we see that i + 1's
best response is to locate at the largest location that deters entry to the left. Thus, the threat
is empty and the best response is unique. ¥
A.11 Proof of Theorem 5
As for part (i), note ¯rst that the ¯rm at ½B earns K to its right by de¯nition of ½B. As for the
¯rm at ¸n, note that when f is increasing, x¤(y;¸(y)) = ¸(y)¡ so that ¼(¸(y)¡;y;¸(y)) = K.
Thus, the ¯rm at ¸n earns K to its left so that di®erences in their pro¯ts can only accrue from
di®erences in earnings between ¸n and ½B. In terms of distances, both grasp exactly
½B+¸n
2 .
However, the density over the share grasped by the ¯rm at ½B being larger than for the share
catered by the ¯rm at ¸n, it follows that the ¯rm at ½B earns strictly more. The proof for part
(ii) is completely analogous. ¥
A.12 Proof of Theorem 6
We only prove the result for the case where f is increasing, the case where it is decreasing
being completely analogous. Consider Figure 8 to see that the equilibrium pro¯t of the ¯rm at
location xi is equal to the sum of two areas: To the left, it gets an area of size K, and to the
38Figure 8: ¼(xi) = T + Ai+1.
right an area of size Ai+1, which is smaller than K. So
¼(xi) = T + Ai+1:
Let ¢i := ¢(xi¡1;x1), i.e. half of the distance between the equilibrium locations xi¡1 and xi.
Because f(x) increases in x, ¢i+1 < ¢i holds. We are now going to show that for the areas Ai
the following holds: Ai < Ai+1 for any i ¸ 1. Since ¼(xi) = T + Ai+1, this will then complete
the proof.
Observe ¯rst that Ai = T ¡Ci¡Di. So Ai < Ai+1 will hold if we can show that Di+1 < Di
and Ci+1 < Ci holds. De¯ne ~ fi(x) ´ f(x) ¡ f(xi ¡ ¢i) for x 2 [xi ¡ ¢i;xi]. Clearly, ~ f0
i > 0
and ~ f00
i · 0 holds. For any y < ¢i+1 this implies











~ fi+1dx = Ci+1:
The ¯rst and last equality are identities. The ¯rst inequality is due to the fact that ¢i > ¢i+1,
and the weak inequality follows from (4). Thus, Ci+1 < Ci is established.
Similarly, de¯ne ^ fi(x) ´ f(xi) ¡ f(x) for x 2 [xi ¡ 2¢i;xi ¡ 2¢i]. For any y < ¢i+1,
^ fi(xi ¡ 2¢i + y) ¸ ^ fi+1(xi+1 ¡ 2¢i+1 + y) (5)










^ fi+1dx = Di+1:
The proof for part (ii) is completely analogous. ¥
A.13 Proof of Theorem 7
The proof is based on Theorem 4 and is straightforward. On the increasing part, all best
responses are independent of the location of the right-hand neighbor. Hence f¸B;::;¸rg follows.
On the decreasing part, best responses are independent of the left-hand neighbor's location,
whence f½s;::;½Bg follows. ¥
A.14 Proof of Lemma 7
The length of the interval captured by the entrant is always R¡L
2 independent of his location.
Now let the entrant locate at one end of the interval (say, at L+) and let him contemplate
moving marginally towards the middle. Either his pro¯t increases immediately. In this case,
however, his pro¯t will keep increasing as he moves further to the right since he keeps losing
less on the left and gaining more on the right. Thus, the optimal location will be R¡ in this
situation. Or, the move towards the right will initially involve losses. If this is the case for all
positions to the right of L+, then he optimally locates at L+. If eventually the pro¯t starts
increasing by moving further right, then it will increase monotonically from there onwards.
Hence, the optimal location in this case will be either L+ or R¡. ¥
A.15 Proof of Corollary 5
Suppose to the contrary that in equilibrium M is occupied by, say, ¯rm k. From Theorem
2, it follows that its left- and right-hand neighbors will be at some locations xL ¸ ½(M) and











moving marginally to the right, the pro¯t of k increases: It gains more on the right than it
40loses on the left. Note that this is true independently of whether the right-hand neighbor is
already there or not: If it is not there, by moving right to some x > M, k pushes its future
right-hand neighbor to ¸(x). Even if the move to the right will attract entry to the left at ½(x),











, analogous arguments apply for the opposite direction. ¥
A.16 Proof of Theorem 8
We are going to argue that for trough-symmetric functions, ½M and ¸M are mutually best
responses. Once this is shown, the Theorem follows immediately from the previous results on
monotone densities. So, suppose some ¯rm is located at ¸M. Observe then that any location
y 2 [½M;¸M] will deter entry in between: For y > ½M, x¤(y;¸M) = ¸¡
M. But ¼¤ < K
since
y+¸M
2 > M because of trough-symmetry. Since moving away from the middle without
attracting entry is always bene¯cial, ½M dominates any interior location. Notice then that at
y = ½M the ¯rm nets exactly K to the right, again because of trough-symmetry. Thus, this is
a best response. Mutuality of best responses follows from trough-symmetry.
To see that these equilibrium locations are unique assume to the contrary that y < ¸M.
Then the best replying left-hand neighbor will locate at some z < ½M. But then y < ¸M cannot
have been optimal in the ¯rst place. ¥
A.17 Proof of Lemma 8
All we need to show is that an decrease in " leads to an increase in the mass to the left of ¸n
and to the right of ½n. Observe that both ¸n and ½n depend on " and that because of symmetry
there is no loss of generality if we focus on ¸n and the mass to its left. To see that the mass
between two locations ¸i and ¸i+1 increases as " decreases, assume to the contrary that it does
not. But then, because fh
"0 is °atter than fh
" for "0 < " it follows that the ¯rm at ¸i attracts
to its right more consumers for "0 than for " while the one at ¸i+1 attracts to its left less than
41for " and thus less than K, which is a contradiction. Therefore, the mass between any two
neighboring ¯rms increases as " decreases. Thus, if initially at "0 ¸n and ½n deter further entry
in between, they will do so a fortiori for any " < "0. ¥
A.18 Proof of Theorem 9
In the uniform case, the left- and rightmost locations are ¸B and ½B, respectively. Moreover,
the remaining interval (¸B;½B) has a mass of consumers of F(½B) ¡ F(¸B) = 1 ¡ 2K. As
long as ¯rms enter at ¸- or ½-distances from each other, each additional entrant reduces the
remaining mass of consumers by the maximum amount 2K (see part (iii) of Lemma 4 and the
discussion following that Lemma). Moreover, should a last, and smaller interval exist, one more
¯rm will enter. This interval will satisfy the condition L < ½(R) < ¸(L) < R. As was shown,
in part (ii) of Theorem 1, this is equal to the minimum number of ¯rms entering in such an
interval for any distribution.
For general distributions, as shown in Theorem 3, the left- and rightmost locations are
a · ¸B and b ¸ ½B, respectively, so that the interval (a;b) has a mass of consumers of
F(b)¡F(a) ¸ 1¡2K. Moreover, from Theorem 2, ¯rms cannot be located further away from
each other than ¸- or ½-distances, so that each additional entrant will reduce the remaining
mass of consumers by (weakly) less than the maximum amount 2K.
Taken together, in the uniform case, the size of the relevant interval is minimum, and ¯rms
are located at maximum distance from each other in this interval, so that the number of active
¯rms cannot be larger than under any other distribution. ¥
B Price setting for advertisement revenue by media ¯rms
In media markets, while consumer price competition is often either non-existing or of minor
importance, media ¯rms do compete in prices for advertisement revenue. Examples are free
newspapers and private on-air TV and radio broadcasting in Europe, where there exists a
42typically binding restriction on how much broadcasters may advertise. In this appendix we
allow media ¯rms to set prices for advertisement and show that, under quite general conditions,
the overall pro¯t of a media ¯rm is proportional to its market share. As a result, the model
we have considered so far can be seen as a reduced form of an augmented setting where ¯rms
choose both, locations and prices for advertisement (thereby maintaining the assumption that
do not set prices for consumers).
Consider a ¯nite number of media ¯rms located in the [0;1]-interval. The market share of
media ¯rm i is denoted µi > 0, and it can set a price pi for an advertisement slot.
Moreover, there exists a unit mass of advertisement ¯rms which di®er with respect to their
willingness to pay for placing ads. In particular, assume that the payo® of an advertisement
¯rm of type s when placing in ad in media ¯rm i is sµi¡pi. Assume that s is private information
to each advertisement ¯rm, and distributed on [0,1] according to c.d.f. G with density g > 0,
satisfying (1 ¡ G)=g · 0. Thus, the model framework corresponds to that of Anderson and
Coate (2005) except that consumers here are not assumed to dislike ads.
Clearly, each advertisement ¯rm will place an ad in media outlet i if sµi¡pi ¸ 0 , s ¸ pi=µi.
Note that, consistent with reality, we allow advertisement ¯rms to "multi-home", i.e. to place
ads in more than one media outlet. Furthermore, each consumer "single-homes", i.e. patronizes
only one media outlet so that the sets of consumers which advertisement ¯rms address through
di®erent medias are disjoint.32 As a result, each advertisement ¯rm separately decides for each
media outlets whether or not to place an ad.
Given the above decision rule, the number of advertisement ¯rms who accept a given price




32See Kim and Serfes (2006) for a standard Hotelling model with prices where consumers \multi-home".
43yielding the ¯rst-order condition
















µi is unique and independent of µi. Consequently, neither G(p¤
i(µi)=µi) nor
g(p¤















which is constant. Thus, each media ¯rm's total pro¯t is proportional to its market share,
which corresponds to the framework we have analyzed in this paper.
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